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DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION
Collaboratory on Legal Education and Licensing for Practice*
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting shutdowns are affecting every aspect
of society. The legal profession and the justice system have been profoundly
disrupted at precisely the time when there is an unprecedented need for legal
services to deal with a host of legal issues generated by the pandemic, including
disaster relief, health law, insurance, labor law, criminal justice, domestic violence,
and civil rights. The need for lawyers to address these issues is great but the
prospect of licensing new lawyers is challenging due to the serious health
consequences of administering the bar examination during the pandemic.
State Supreme Courts are actively considering alternative paths to licensure.
One such alternative is the diploma privilege, a path to licensure currently used
only in Wisconsin. Wisconsin’s privilege, limited to graduates of its two in-state
schools, has triggered constitutional challenges never fully resolved by the lower
courts. As states consider emergency diploma privileges to address the pandemic,
they will face these unresolved constitutional issues.
This Article explores those constitutional challenges and concludes that a
diploma privilege limited to graduates of in-state schools raises serious Dormant
Commerce Clause questions that will require the state to tie the privilege to the
particular competencies in-state students develop and avenues they have to
demonstrate those competencies to the state’s practicing bar over three years.
Meeting that standard will be particularly difficult if a state adopts an in-state
* The Collaboratory is a group of eleven scholars who have studied and written about the bar
exam and licensing for many years. In a policy paper published on March 23, 2020, we pooled our
knowledge to offer suggestions for how jurisdictions might continue licensing new lawyers in the face
of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Claudia Angelos et al., The Bar Exam and the COVID-19 Pandemic:
The Need for Immediate Action (The Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Legal Studies, Working
Paper No. 537, 2020), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3559060 [https://perma.cc/5NWZ-JST4].
The members of the Collaboratory are: Claudia Angelos (New York University); Sara Berman
(AccessLex Institute); Mary Lu Bilek (City University of New York); Carol L. Chomsky (University
of Minnesota); Andrea Anne Curcio (Georgia State University); Marsha Griggs (Washburn
University); Joan W. Howarth (University of Nevada, Las Vegas); Eileen R. Kaufman (Touro College);
Deborah Jones Merritt (Ohio State University); Patricia Salkin (Touro College); and Judith W.
Wegner (University of North Carolina). The authors have contributed to this Article as individual
scholars and not as representatives of their respective institutions.
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privilege on an emergency basis. States should consider other options, including
privileges that do not prefer in-state schools. The analysis is important both for
states considering emergency measures and for those that might restructure their
licensing after the pandemic.
INTRODUCTION
Legal education, like every other facet of life, has been upended by the COVID19 pandemic. With no forewarning, law schools quickly converted their courses
to remote instruction, adopted new grading policies, canceled or postponed
commencement ceremonies, and debated furloughs and layoffs for staff who
could not work remotely. First- and second-year law students face the cancellation
of some summer jobs and internships as legal employers adjust to the same public
health challenges. Graduating law school students face an especially serious
disruption as jurisdiction after jurisdiction cancels the July administration of the
bar exam1 and students face their own individual and family health challenges,
leaving them wondering when and how they will be able to be licensed as
attorneys. Their jobs and careers may depend on when the graduates receive their
licenses. Judges, bar associations, and bar examiners are weighing a variety of
options to meet this crisis of uncertainty facing graduating law students.
Meanwhile, the pandemic and accompanying shutdowns are unleashing a
tsunami of legal claims.2 Low- and middle-income individuals, who already
struggle to obtain representation, will need particular help.3 Newly admitted

1. As of May 18, 2020, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and the Virgin Islands had canceled
the July exam. July 2020 Bar Exam: Jurisdiction Information, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS,
http://www.ncbex.org/ncbe-covid-19-updates/july-2020-bar-exam-jurisdiction-information/
(last
updated May 22, 2020, 1:22 PM) [https://perma.cc/CY8P-KVL9]. On May 5, the National
Conference of Bar Examiners announced that “there will most likely be a sufficient number of July
examinees to administer the bar exam” in July, so as of that date, it planned to make exam materials
(MBE, MEE, and MPT) available to those jurisdictions that choose to administer a July exam. NCBE
COVID-19 Updates, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS (May 5, 2020, 10:55 AM),
http://www.ncbex.org/ncbe-covid-19-updates/ [https://perma.cc/JLR4-TTFJ]. It also announced its
plans to offer two more administrations—on September 9–10, 2020, and on September 30–October
1. Past NCBE COVID-19 Updates, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS (Apr. 3, 2020),
http://www.ncbex.org/ncbe-covid-19-updates/past-updates/
[https://perma.cc/7HY3-AV6Y].
Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, and Oregon have indicated that they lack
(or will lack) sufficient seats to accommodate all test takers in a bar examination administered in
small settings. July 2020 Bar Exam: Jurisdiction Information, supra.
2. Shayna Jacobs, 771 Lawsuits — and Counting: Wave of Virus Litigation Hits Businesses Across the
U.S., WASH. POST (May 1, 2020, 4:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/771-lawsuits—and-counting-wave-of-virus-litigation-hits-businesses-across-theus/2020/05/01/6f7c015c-89c3-11ea-9dfd-990f9dcc71fc_story.html
[https://perma.cc/4LUGBKZ8].
3. Recognizing that fact, the American Bar Association (ABA) has created a Coronavirus
(COVID-19) task force. The ABA Coronavirus (COVID-19) Task Force, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/the-aba-task-force-on-legal-needs-arising-out-of-the-2020pandem/ [https://perma.cc/7XM3-2EZ9].The New York State Bar Association announced a pro
bono network to connect volunteer attorneys with those needing assistance, with an initial focus on
navigating the unemployment insurance benefits and application process. See COVID-19 Pro Bono
Network, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N, https://nysba.org/covidvolunteer/ [https://perma.cc/5QLC-AYWQ].

COPYRIGHT © 2020 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

170

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 73:168

lawyers disproportionately serve those needs through positions in government,
nonprofits, and small law firms.4 To address those needs, it is essential to keep
the gates to our profession open.
One of many proposed licensing options to address the disruptions is the
“diploma privilege.” A pure diploma privilege would make graduation from an
ABA-accredited law school sufficient evidence of competence to practice law, with
no requirement that the graduate take a bar examination.5 A more restricted
diploma privilege would add a requirement that the graduate have studied a
specified set of core subject areas, completed a clinical program, or satisfied other
educational prerequisites to qualify for the privilege. A “diploma-plus privilege”
would entail post-graduation requirements such as a specified number of hours of
supervised practice, completion of a state-specific set of tutorials, or a Bridge the
Gap program of the sort available currently in a number of jurisdictions.6
Only one state (Wisconsin) currently has a diploma privilege pre-dating the
pandemic, but thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have at some time
in their histories embraced some version of the privilege.7 Some states granted a
universal diploma privilege in which the state admitted anyone who had a
diploma from any U.S. law school; others limited the privilege to graduates of any
school within the state or only graduates of the state’s public law schools.8 Utah
recently created an emergency diploma-plus privilege in response to the COVID19 pandemic applicable to first-time exam-takers from schools with a specified bar
pass rate.9 Advocates around the country have urged other states to consider

4. See CLASS OF 2018 NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT (2019),
https://www.nalp.org/uploads/NationalSummaryReport_Classof2018_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3UFH-6X83] (showing that almost half of bar-required jobs taken by recent
graduates fall in these three categories).
5. Under proposals for a diploma privilege, character and fitness review would remain
unchanged.
6. For examples of Bridge the Gap programs, see the programs in New York, West Virginia,
and
Pennsylvania.
Bridge
the
Gap
Program,
W.
VA .
ST.
B.,
https://www.wvyounglawyers.com/members/bridge-the-gap/ (last updated Mar. 20, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/N8KW-WXW8]; Bridge the Gap, PA. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.,
https://www.pacle.org/providers/bridge-the-gap [https://perma.cc/T3TV-JFCX]; Bridging the Gap,
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N, https://www.nysba.org/bridging-the-gap/ [https://perma.cc/7282-Z4ZX].
7. Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin Diploma Privilege: Try It, You’ll Like It, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 645,
646 (2000). Wisconsin initially allowed the privilege only for its public law school (University of
Wisconsin) but later extended it to the only other law school in the state (Marquette University Law
School, a private law school). See WIS. STAT. § 256.28(1) (1931). For a historical discussion of
Wisconsin’s diploma privilege, see Daniel B. Nora, Note, On Wisconsin: The Viability of Diploma
Privilege Regulations under Dormant Commerce Clause Review, 37 J.C. & U.L. 447, 473–76 (2011). For a
comprehensive explanation of the Wisconsin diploma privilege, see Moran, supra, at 645–49.
8. Moran, supra note 7 at 646.
9. See Order for Temporary Amendments to Bar Admission Procedures During COVID-19 Outbreak,
UTAH SUP. CT. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.utcourts.gov/alerts/docs/20200421%20%20Bar%20Waiver%20Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/34VJ-9RAQ]. Under that measure, first-time
bar exam takers who graduate by June 2020 from an ABA-accredited law school that had a first-time
bar pass rate in 2019 of at least 86% may obtain a Utah license after completing 360 hours of
supervised practice. See id.
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adopting a diploma10 or diploma-plus11 privilege.
If a state elects to grant a diploma privilege only to graduates of in-state schools,
as Wisconsin does now and some other states have done historically, a variety of
constitutional issues arise. Does that practice violate the Equal Protection Clause,
the right to travel, the Dormant Commerce Clause, or the Privileges and
Immunities Clause? Some of these questions have been discussed but not
definitively resolved in previous challenges to state diploma privileges.12 In light
of the cancellation of the July administration of the bar exam by a significant
number of states, the growing unlikelihood of large gatherings any time in 2020,13
and consideration of a diploma privilege by a growing number of jurisdictions,
these constitutional questions have taken on immediate significance.14
10. See Letter from Einass Abdelmoula et al., to the Task Force on the N.Y. Bar Examination,
N.Y.
State
Bar
Ass’n
(Mar.
26,
2020),
https://images.law.com/contrib/content/uploads/documents/292/Law-Student-Letter-to-NYSBARE-COVID.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4AV-4DM4] (letter to the New York State Bar Association Task
Force on the New York Bar Examination from more than 1,000 bar applicants); Letter from Kerry
Abrams, Duke Dean of the Sch. of L., et al., to Janet Difiore, Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of Appeals
(May 2, 2020), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/georgetown-law-joins-law-schools-askingcourt-to-reconsider-ny-bar-decision/ [https://perma.cc/NGP6-V327] (letter to the New York Court
of Appeals from the deans of twenty-one law schools); Letter from L. Song Richardson, Dean of the
Univ. of Cal., Irvine, Sch. of L., et al., to Tani G. Cantil-Skauye, Chief Justice, Cal. Supreme Court,
et al. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6843403/Lawdeansletter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GQ3Z-A2MF] (letter to the Supreme Court of California from the dean and
alumni of the University of California, Irvine).
11. For a diploma-plus proposal that includes both supervised practice and Bridge the Gap
courses, see Claudia Angelos et al., Insight: New York’s Bar Exam Changes Are Misguided—Here’s a
Proposal, BLOOMBERG L. (May 7, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/insight-new-yorks-bar-exam-changes-are-misguided-heres-a-new-proposal
[https://perma.cc/94RQ-PF6D].
12. While Wisconsin is the only state currently providing a diploma privilege, other states have
repealed diploma privileges that were the subject of litigation addressing some of these issues. See
infra notes 21, 28 and accompanying text.
13. See generally DANIELLE ALLEN ET AL., WHEN CAN WE GO OUT? EVALUATING POLICY
PARADIGMS FOR RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 THREAT (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-ethics/files/whitepaper_2__when_can_we_go_out_3.25.20_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KR3-93GA]; SCOTT GOTTLIEB ET AL.,
NATIONAL CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE: A ROAD MAP TO REOPENING (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/National-Coronavirus-Response-a-Road-Mapto-Recovering-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7X3-TQXK].
14. Some states have announced plans to grant priority to graduates of in-state schools when
allocating limited seats for the bar exam, which raises related constitutional issues. New York
announced that it will be unable to accommodate all candidates for its September 9–10
administration of the bar exam, and first priority will go to graduates of New York’s fifteen law
schools. Notices: Application Period for the September 2020 Bar Examination, N.Y. ST. BOARD L.
EXAMINERS (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nybarexam.org/ [https://perma.cc/RD4R-6YGY]. Others
are encouraged to take the exam later or travel to other jurisdictions. Id. North Dakota plans to hold
a July administration but limit seats to 85 or less. Bar Exam Application, ST. N.D. CTS.,
https://www.ndcourts.gov/supreme-court/committees/board-of-law-examiners/bar-examapplication [https://perma.cc/B2YY-J8A9]. North Dakota’s State Board of Law Examiners created
three categories of priorities: those already registered as of April 1, 2020, followed by graduates of the
University of North Dakota, followed by everyone else. Id. Missouri has also limited seats for its July
bar exam and will prioritize a combination of Missouri residents, graduates of schools in Missouri or
a contiguous state, and applicants with employment connections to the state. Information About Bar
Admissions
and
COVID-19,
MO. BOARD L. EXAMINERS
(Apr.
28,
2020),
https://www.mble.org/news.action?id=1700
[https://perma.cc/M98W-TFY7].
Massachusetts
announced that sufficient seats may not be available when it administers the exam on September 30–
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Part I of this paper considers the issues that in-state diploma privileges raise
with respect to the Equal Protection Clause and the right to travel. We conclude
that adopting an in-state diploma privilege is likely permissible with respect to
both because the privilege need only satisfy the rational basis test. Part II analyzes
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and concludes there is no violation, even
though the practice of law is considered a protected privilege. The more difficult
questions are discussed in Part III, which analyzes the Dormant Commerce Clause
claim.
We conclude that a diploma privilege limited to graduates of in-state public law
schools would raise no Dormant Commerce Clause issues because of the market
participant exception to that doctrine. A privilege limited to in-state schools that
encompassed private institutions, on the other hand, would raise serious issues
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. If the courts focus on the privilege’s facial
discrimination between in-state businesses (law schools) and out-of-state ones, the
state would have to demonstrate that it has a non-protectionist state interest that
cannot be satisfied by nondiscriminatory means. This is a very high burden that
would likely not be satisfied. If courts focus instead on the graduates of those
schools, the privilege might not be seen as discriminatory and it would be judged
by a more lenient balancing test. Under those circumstances, a diploma privilege
would likely survive constitutional scrutiny if the adopting state fashioned its rule
to serve a non-protectionist purpose and established an adequate justification for
distinguishing in-state from out-of-state schools.
Paying attention to constitutional constraints is essential for any state
considering adoption of a diploma privilege, but constitutional concerns need not
foreclose state adoption of a diploma privilege, whether to address the licensing
crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic or to govern admission of competent
attorneys after the crisis ends.15 States with only public law schools can grant
diploma privileges to graduates of their schools without violating the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Other states could avoid challenges by adopting privileges that
apply evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state law schools. A state could, for
example, grant a diploma privilege to graduates of any law school that emphasizes
the law of the state granting the privilege. In-state schools would be most likely to
satisfy that requirement, but out-of-state schools (especially those located close to
state lines) might also qualify. This type of privilege would not be treated as
discriminatory and would, therefore, avoid the strictest scrutiny under the
Dormant Commerce Clause.
If a state prefers to grant a diploma privilege solely to graduates of in-state

October 1; under those circumstances, graduates of Massachusetts law schools will get first priority.
Important Notice – Massachusetts Bar Exam, September 30-October 1, 2020, MASS. BOARD B. EXAMINERS,
https://www.mass.gov/orgs/massachusetts-board-of-bar-examiners [https://perma.cc/9RG6-6KZE].
While not creating diploma privileges, and therefore not the subject of this Article, these limitations
raise similar constitutional issues. The rules in New York and Massachusetts almost certainly are
protectionist—in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The North Dakota and Missouri rules
are somewhat more complicated, but also raise issues under that clause. See infra Part III for a
discussion of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
15. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the constitutionality of diploma privileges. The
various policy issues implicated by diploma privileges are outside the scope of this work.
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schools, including at least one private school, the constitutional constraints are
most severe. To defend that type of privilege, a state should build a record focused
on the ways in which in-state educational experiences demonstrate minimum
competence of their graduates to practice in the state. Simply preferring graduates
of in-state schools could be viewed as unconstitutional protectionism; establishing
a diploma privilege grounded in specific educational and experiential
requirements associated with minimum competencies to practice in the state is
more likely to pass muster.
I. DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE RIGHT TO
TRAVEL
A. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The claim that a diploma privilege violates the Equal Protection Clause would
be evaluated based on the rational basis test, which merely requires that the rule
be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.16 State licensing laws, like all
other economic and social legislation, trigger use of that highly deferential test,
sometimes referred to as the “any conceivable basis” test, which represents the
lowest level of judicial scrutiny.17 Heightened scrutiny is not applicable because
the policy at issue does not implicate a fundamental right and does not
discriminate on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. In a series of
cases, the Supreme Court has shown considerable deference when confronted
with challenges to state regulation of licensed professionals.18 Indeed, the courts
have specifically held that state bar admission restrictions are subject to mere
rational basis review and have shown deference when reviewing rules relating to
admission practices.19
Given the deferential standard of review—being rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose—a state’s adoption of the diploma privilege should easily withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Ensuring high standards within the state bar has been
recognized as a legitimate state purpose,20 and the state could demonstrate that
restricting the diploma privilege to graduates of in-state schools is rationally
related to that goal by showing, even minimally, the ways in which in-state schools
will prepare students for practicing law in that state better than out-of-state
schools.21 Possible justifications are outlined in Part III, where we discuss
16. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1975).
17. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
18. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978); Martin v. Walton, 368
U.S. 25, 239 (1961) (per curiam); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957);
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 177 (1910).
19. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037,
1045 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lupert v. Cal. State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985)); Nat’l
Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice (NAAMJP) v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216, 219–
20 (3d Cir. 2015); Kirkpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100, 103 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Schumacher
v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1268 (3d Cir. 1992).
20. See, e.g., Berch, 773 F.3d at 1045.
21. See, e.g., Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 686 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (rejecting an equal
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arguments that might support the privilege under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
For these reasons, challenges to a diploma privilege asserted on equal
protection grounds have not been and are unlikely to be successful.22
B. RIGHT TO TRAVEL
For many years, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was thought to protect only rights of United States citizenship and
thus conveyed no separate judicially enforceable rights for state citizens.23
However, in 1999 in Saenz v. Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the clause
also protects the right to travel.24 In that case, the state of California imposed a
durational residency requirement on applicants for public assistance and limited
new arrivals to collecting the amount of public assistance they had received in
their states of origin.25 The Court held that such a policy violated the right to
travel protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As outlined by the court in Saenz, the right to travel protects three
different rights:
the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to
become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of
that State.26
Unlike the statute struck down in Saenz, a diploma privilege does not impede
interstate travel. Travelers to a new state are not being denied benefits offered
longer term residents. A diploma privilege “neither establishes a classification
based on residency nor erects a barrier to migration.”27 Residents and
nonresidents are treated the same. If they graduate from an in-state school, they
protection challenge to Mississippi’s diploma privilege); see also Goetz v. Harrison, 462 P.2d 891, 894
(Mont. 1969) (justifying Montana’s diploma privilege because the Montana Supreme Court was able
to maintain a close relationship with faculty, students, and the curriculum).
22. See Shenfield, 387 F. Supp. at 688–89; Huffman v. Mont. Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175,
1183 (D. Mont. 1974); see also Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 663–64 (7th Cir. 1985).
23. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78–79 (1872).
24. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510–11 (1999).
25. Id. at 493. Before Saenz, durational residency requirements were analyzed under the Equal
Protection Clause. In a series of cases, the Court struck down durational residency requirements as
violating a fundamental right to travel. See, e.g., Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 269
(1974) (invalidating a durational residency requirement as a condition of receiving nonemergency
hospitalization or medical care at the county’s expense); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360
(1972) (invalidating a one-year residency requirement for voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 642 (1969) (striking down a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits), overruled in
part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Since the diploma privilege does not
discriminate based on length of in-state residence, these cases are inapposite.
26. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
27. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice (NAAMJP) v. Castille,
799 F.3d 216, 219 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1268 (3d Cir. 1992))
(upholding Pennsylvania’s rule which limits admission of out-of-state lawyers to those from a
reciprocal state).
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can take advantage of the diploma privilege. If they graduate from a school in
another state, they may not. Not surprisingly, federal courts have rejected
challenges to a diploma privilege asserted on right to travel grounds.28
II. DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE AND THE PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE OF ARTICLE IV
Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States.”29 This clause was intended to protect only “those ‘privileges’ and
‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.”30 The
clause has been interpreted to prevent states from discriminating against citizens
of other states only with respect to fundamental constitutional rights and
important economic activities, such as the right to earn a livelihood.31 The right
to practice law in a state has been identified as just such a protected “privilege”
within the meaning of this clause.32
In order to withstand a Privileges and Immunities challenge, the state must
demonstrate not only a substantial reason for the difference in treatment for
residents, but also that the discrimination against nonresidents is closely related
to the state’s objective.33 In conducting that analysis, the Court considers the
availability of less restrictive means.34
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
New Hampshire could not deny admission to out-of-state applicants who had
passed the New Hampshire bar exam and met all of the state’s requirements
except for residency.35 The Court rejected the state’s offered justifications—that
nonresidents would be less likely to become familiar with local rules, to behave
ethically, to be available for court proceedings, and to do pro bono work—as
insubstantial.36 There was little or no evidence to support the asserted
justifications, and the minimal effect could easily be addressed by less restrictive

28. Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 685–86 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Huffman v. Mont.
Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (D. Mont. 1974). Although both of these cases were
decided before Saenz, the analysis offered above suggests that the outcomes would not be different
after Saenz. Since Saenz, federal courts have rejected right-to-travel challenges to reciprocal bar
admissions standards, reinforcing the conclusion that differential bar admissions rules do not violate
the right to travel under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Castille,
799 F.3d at 219–20; Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch, 773,
F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 2014).
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
30. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
31. Id. at 385–86. The Court distinguished elk hunting (a recreational activity) from commercial
shrimping, finding that the Privileges & Immunities Clause applies to the right to earn a livelihood
but not to recreational activities. Id. at 386–88.
32. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 66 (1988); Supreme Court of N.H. v.
Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280–81 (1985).
33. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65; Piper, 470 U.S. at 284.
34. Piper, 470 U.S. at 284.
35. Id. at 288. The term “resident” is used interchangeably with “citizen” for purposes of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64.
36. Piper, 470 U.S. at 285.
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means.37 The Court further concluded that the means—denying admission to outof-state applicants—was insufficiently related to the state’s objectives.38
In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
similar arguments from the state when the Court determined that it was a
violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to require out-of-state residents
already licensed in another state to take a bar exam for admission in Virginia while
allowing in-state residents licensed elsewhere to be admitted in Virginia on
motion.39 The Court “reaffirmed” the “well-settled principle” established in Piper
that “one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to citizens of State A is
that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens
of that State.”40 The question then becomes whether “substantial reasons exist for
the discrimination and [whether] the degree of discrimination bears a close
relation to such reasons.”41 As in Piper, the Court rejected Virginia’s
justifications—that nonresidents would be less invested in the jurisdiction,
participate less in bar activities, and perform fewer public service responsibilities—
as unproven or easily attainable by means not infringing on constitutional
privileges.42
While the right to practice law in a state is a protected “privilege,” lower courts
have found that a state does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause by
adopting a reciprocity provision, which only permits admission by motion for
nonresidents from states with reciprocal admission rules.43 Thus, in National Ass’n
for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch, the Ninth Circuit upheld
Arizona’s reciprocal admission on motion (AOM) rule, finding that it did not
distinguish on the basis of residency:
The AOM Rule is neutral: the State of Arizona imposes the same bar
admission requirements on its own citizens as it does on citizens of other
states. If a citizen of Arizona is admitted to the bar in a state that does not
share reciprocity with Arizona, then the attorney is not eligible to be
admitted to the Arizona Bar on motion, irrespective of the attorney’s
residency or citizenship status.44
“Even if Arizona’s AOM Rule did infringe on a right protected by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause,” the court added, it was “closely related to advancing a
substantial state interest.”45 In that case, the substantial state interests included
Arizona’s “considerable interest in regulating its state bar” as well as its interest in
“ensuring that attorneys licensed in Arizona will be treated equally in states having
37. Id. at 285, 287.
38. Id. at 285–88.
39. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 70.
40. Piper, 470 U.S. at 280 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
41. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 67.
42. Id. at 68.
43. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice (NAAMJP) v. Castille,
799 F.3d 216, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2015); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice
v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 2014).
44. Berch, 773 F.3d at 1046.
45. Id. (citing Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65).
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reciprocity with Arizona.”46
A Privileges and Immunities claim was also rejected in a lower-court case
challenging a requirement that nonresident members of the state bar maintain a
physical office in the state.47 In Schoenefeld v. Schneiderman, the Second Circuit held
that protected privileges and immunities are burdened “only when [challenged]
laws were enacted for [a] protectionist purpose.”48 In other words, in the absence
of a protectionist purpose, a Privileges and Immunities Clause claim fails.49 Since
the requirement that nonresidents maintain a physical office within the state was
enacted to enable service of process, the plaintiff failed to prove a protectionist
purpose, even though the “office requirement is now largely vestigial as a means
of ensuring [process].”50
What about an in-state diploma privilege? Like Arizona’s reciprocal privilege
upheld in Berch, a diploma privilege would not distinguish among applicants
based on state residency since residents of any state could take advantage of the
privilege as long as they attended an in-state law school. Conversely, citizens who
attended an out-of-state school would be ineligible for the privilege. The rule is
neutral; it “imposes the same bar admission requirements on [a state’s] own
citizens as it does on citizens of other states.”51 As required by Piper, citizens of all
states would have the same opportunity to be licensed in the state establishing the
diploma privilege. The only burden on out-of-state residents would be both
speculative and indirect—in-state schools might admit proportionally more in-state
residents, making it marginally more difficult for out-of-state students to attend
an in-state school.52
Even if a court somehow concluded that a diploma privilege problematically
distinguished between residents and nonresidents, a state could justify an in-state
privilege under Piper and Friedman by showing that the privilege is closely related
to the advancement of a substantial state interest. Unlike the justifications offered
and rejected in Piper and Friedman, the reasons for distinguishing graduates of instate schools from those of out-of-state schools are “substantial” and the small
burden generated by that distinction would “bear[] a close relation” to the reasons
46. Id.
47. Schoenefeld v. Schneiderman, 821 F.3d 273, 287 (2d Cir. 2016).
48. Id. at 279 (alterations in original) (quoting McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 227 (2013)).
49. Id. at 282–83.
50. Id. at 282.
51. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037, 1046
(9th Cir. 2014).
52. It is far from clear that in-state schools prefer residents of their own state over nonresidents.
Some schools, in fact, may favor out-of-state residents to burnish their reputations as national law
schools. Public law schools have an additional economic interest in favoring nonresidents because
those students pay higher tuition rates than residents. See Ilana Kowarski, See the Price, Payoff of Law
School
Before
Enrolling,
U.S.
NEWS
(Mar.
18,
2020,
8:00
AM),
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/law-school-coststarting-salary [https://perma.cc/YQ84-4L6S]. Unless restricted by state laws requiring preferences
for residents (which are rare in the context of law schools), those states’ public law schools may thus
favor nonresidents, or at least not discriminate between them and residents. Applicants, of course,
may find it easier to attend a law school in the state where they reside rather than travel to another
state for their education. Again, however, any burden imposed by an in-state diploma privilege on
nonresidents is both marginal and indirect.
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for providing a diploma privilege.53 The justifications that a state would likely
assert would focus on ensuring that graduates are competent to practice law in the
state. These justifications are explored more fully in the next section.
III. DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the affirmative power to regulate
interstate commerce.54 But it also serves as a limit on the states’ power to regulate
interstate commerce when Congress has not acted, that is, when Congress’s power
lies “dormant.”55 The Dormant Commerce Clause has been referred to as one of
the “great silences” of the Constitution.56 Its purpose is to prevent trade barriers
among the states.57 In fact, removing state trade barriers and preventing interstate
economic rivalries was a principal reason for the adoption of the Constitution.58
The governing principle of the Dormant Commerce Clause is that state and
local laws that place an undue burden on interstate commerce are
unconstitutional. States cannot discriminate against interstate commerce or outof-state businesses unless there is a non-protectionist and important state purpose
that cannot be achieved by nondiscriminatory means. That is a difficult test to
meet, one that the Supreme Court has referred to as “a virtually per se rule of
invalidity.”59 As Justice Marshall stated in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Authority, “When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic
interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute
without further inquiry.”60
If, however, the state law “has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and
regulates evenhandedly,” the Court applies a more lenient balancing test and
instead asks “whether the State’s interest is legitimate” and strikes the provision
only if “the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”61
While determining which category the challenged rule fits within is all-important
because of the critical difference in the two tests, the Court has acknowledged
that: “[T]here is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is
virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to
the . . . balancing approach. In either situation, the critical consideration is the
overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity.”62
A diploma privilege that is limited to in-state public law schools would not have
to meet either of these standards, however. An important exception to the
53. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 67 (1988).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 539; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
58. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 533.
59. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
60. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).
61. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
62. Id.
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Dormant Commerce Clause allows a state to favor its own citizens when it acts as
a market participant instead of a market regulator.63 “Nothing in the purposes
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State . . . from participating in the
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”64 States that
have only public law schools within the jurisdiction, therefore, could rely upon
the market participant exception65 to confer a diploma privilege on graduates of
those schools.66 States with both public and private law schools in the jurisdiction
could use the same exception if they limited the diploma privilege to graduates of
their public law schools. That distinction would be politically unpopular and
perhaps unwise as a matter of policy, but it is constitutionally permissible.
It seems more likely that a state adopting a diploma privilege would extend that
privilege to all law schools in the state, not just public law schools, and such a
diploma privilege would be subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause
restrictions. The constitutionality of such a provision under the Dormant
Commerce Clause was raised, though not definitively answered, in litigation
challenging the Wisconsin diploma privilege,67 which applies to graduates of its
two law schools, one public (the University of Wisconsin Law School) and the
other private (Marquette University Law School). Wisconsin’s rule was challenged
in a class action by graduates of accredited out-of-state law schools who planned
to practice in Wisconsin but who were required, under Wisconsin rules, to take
and pass the bar exam.68 They argued that Wisconsin’s diploma privilege
discriminates against graduates of out-of-state schools in violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.69 The case was ultimately settled,70 but a decision written by
Judge Posner for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
discussed the merits of the claim and is instructive for any future challenges to instate diploma privileges.71
63. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). A second major exception is
that Congress can authorize the states to discriminate. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652–53 (1981); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980).
Since Congress has no role to play in state licensing of lawyers, that exception will not be explored
in this paper.
64. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810.
65. In Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 706 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting W.C.M. Window
Co v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1984)), Judge Posner described the market participant
doctrine as “emphasiz[ing] the freedom that states have under the Constitution to provide, often
selectively, for the welfare of their residents.” Judge Posner found that the market participant doctrine
did not apply to Wisconsin’s diploma privilege because Wisconsin offered the privilege not only to a
public school (the University of Wisconsin Law School) but also to a private school (Marquette
University Law School). Id. at 707.
66. States that have only public law schools are: Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. See US Law Schools, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/law-schools/ (last
updated Apr. 2018) [https://perma.cc/5ZPQ-W39P].
67. For a comprehensive explanation of the Wisconsin diploma privilege, see generally Moran,
supra note 7.
68. Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 701.
69. Id.
70. Settlement Retains Diploma Privilege, ST. B. WIS. (Mar. 25, 2010),
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/InsideTrack/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=0&Issue=0&
ArticleID=5824 [https://perma.cc/NR2F-SQT3].
71. See Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d 699.
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Judge Posner first recognized the difficulty of distinguishing between the two
tiers of the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis to determine whether a state
regulation is “virtually per se invalid” or instead subject to the more generous
balancing test.72 Indeed, he said, “the two tiers sometimes cannot always be
distinguished in practice—as this case illustrates. On the one hand, the diploma
privilege does favor the economic interests of Wisconsin law schools, but on the
other hand, it has ‘only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates
evenhandedly’” because the privilege applies to both in-state and out-of-state
residents, as long as they attend a law school located in Wisconsin.73 Moreover,
Judge Posner acknowledged that “[a] state’s right to regulate admission to the
practice of law in the state is unquestioned,”74 but because this particular
regulation has some effect on the interstate mobility of lawyers, “the regulation
must be at least minimally reasonable,”75 with—he noted explicitly—an emphasis
on “minimally.”76
Ultimately, Judge Posner concluded that because the suit had been dismissed
for failure to state a claim, the record was insufficient (an “evidentiary vacuum”)
to identify the benefits of the diploma privilege or to identify and balance those
against the burdens—even minimal burdens—on interstate commerce.77 If, as the
plaintiffs claimed, the curriculum at Wisconsin schools offered no more
Wisconsin law than was offered at out-of-state schools—if the Wisconsin schools
merely required a well-rounded legal education similar to what was offered at every
ABA-accredited law school in the country—then the diploma privilege would
“create[] an arbitrary distinction.”78 While the effect on interstate commerce of
the diploma privilege might be small, requiring very little to justify it, the court
held that the state had to make some showing to support distinguishing between
graduates of Wisconsin’s schools and those of schools located in other states.79
The case was remanded to give the plaintiffs a chance to develop the record.80
After remand, the case was settled, with the plaintiff accepting $7,500 and
agreeing not to participate in further challenges to Wisconsin’s diploma
privilege.81 As a result, the case did not resolve the constitutional questions, but
it provides a helpful foundation to analyze the Dormant Commerce Clause claim.
As Judge Posner indicated, the onus on the state to justify its burden varies
under the two levels of scrutiny, but even the more lenient level of scrutiny

72. See id. at 703; see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986).
73. Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 703 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579).
74. Id. at 704.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 705.
80. Id. at 707.
81. Settlement Retains Diploma Privilege, supra note 70. The class had previously been decertified.
Id. The plaintiff reportedly agreed to settle because he feared that continued litigation would result
in everyone having to take the bar exam, a choice that the court had acknowledged the state could
make. Id.
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requires a state to offer a non-protectionist state interest.82 A state purpose of
ensuring competence to practice law within the state is surely a non-protectionist
and legitimate state interest. The question then turns on the level of scrutiny
applied to the fit between purpose and means and how well the diploma privilege
serves that purpose.
Judge Posner was very quick—perhaps too quick—to conclude that Wisconsin’s
diploma privilege could be judged under the state-favoring, more lenient
balancing test. It is not clear that a diploma privilege limited to in-state schools is
as “evenhanded[]” as Judge Posner posited.83 That type of privilege, on its face,
favors in-state schools (and the students who attend them) over out-of-state schools
(and the individuals who attend them). Wisconsin law schools enjoy some
advantage in recruiting students because those who plan to practice law in the
state know that they will not have to take a bar exam—or devote time and expense
to preparing for that exam—if they matriculate at one of the Wisconsin law
schools. The Dormant Commerce Clause polices just this type of economic
advantage awarded to in-state businesses.
If courts considering challenges to an in-state diploma privilege adopt this lens,
focusing on the economic advantage given in-state law schools and the
discrimination against out-of-state schools, they will apply the Dormant
Commerce Clause’s higher level of scrutiny. A state defending an in-state diploma
privilege would then have to demonstrate far more than “minimal
reasonableness.”84 It would have to demonstrate an important state purpose that
cannot be achieved by nondiscriminatory means.85 One of the only cases to find
that strict standard satisfied is Maine v. Taylor, where the Supreme Court upheld
a state law that prohibited the importation of live baitfish into the state.86 While
the law clearly favored in-state producers of baitfish, the Court found that there
was no other way of protecting Maine’s “unique and fragile fisheries” from
parasites that were common in out-of-state baitfish but not prevalent in Maine.87
Could states supporting an in-state diploma privilege make a comparable
showing? This would present a difficult and perhaps insurmountable challenge.
States enjoy a well-recognized authority to regulate the practice of law, including
the power to protect the public by licensing only attorneys who demonstrate their
minimum competence,88 and they need not identify a single means of establishing
competence. It is common, for example, for states to license some attorneys based
on passage of a bar exam while licensing others based on a period of successful
practice in another jurisdiction.89 As discussed further below, there may be
82. See Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 703.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 704.
85. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986).
86. Id. at 152.
87. Id. at 141.
88. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice (NAAMJP) v. Castille,
799 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2015); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v.
Berch, 733 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2014).
89. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE BAR EXAM’RS & AM. B. ASS’N SECTION LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 42–47
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reasons for a state to conclude that students graduating from in-state schools have
demonstrated minimum competence through their educational experiences in
law school, supporting a diploma privilege. But that would not necessarily justify
excluding out-of-state schools from making a similar showing. In Maine v. Taylor,
there was no practical way to screen out-of-state baitfish to exclude only those
carrying parasites that might infect Maine’s fisheries.90 Out-of-state law schools
might more readily show that their educational experiences demonstrate
competence in a manner comparable to that of in-state schools.
To meet the Dormant Commerce Clause’s stricter level of scrutiny, a state
would have to assemble a record showing that in-state schools provide substantial
opportunities for students to demonstrate their competence that out-of-state
schools lack. Those opportunities might include clinics supervised by in-state
attorneys, jobs and externships in the state, classes taught and evaluated by state
bar members, and frequent interaction with members of the state bar. Out-of-state
schools, the state could argue, might produce graduates who are just as competent
as those from in-state schools, but out-of-state schools lack comparable means of
demonstrating that competence. Constant interaction among faculty, students,
and bar members, in other words, creates an assurance that an in-state school’s
graduates are competent to practice law.
The argument is a novel one, focused on the judgment of the state court and
profession that they can reasonably focus on the competence of a school’s
graduates rather than on the competence of an individual graduate. Deference to
that judgment may be appropriate. In affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court
has indicated a willingness to defer to institutions of higher learning when they
make an “educational judgment that . . . diversity is essential to [their] educational
mission” even while purporting to apply strict scrutiny to race-conscious
decisions.91 Courts have also long deferred to educational institutions with respect
to other academic judgments.92 Defenders of an in-state diploma privilege could
urge courts to show similar deference to the ability of licensing authorities to rely
on in-state law schools to establish the competence of their graduates to licensing
authorities.
It would, of course, be far easier for a state to justify an in-state diploma privilege
under the more generous balancing test applied by Judge Posner. Would other
courts, including the Supreme Court, follow Judge Posner’s lead and apply the
lesser standard? The strongest arguments for that result draw upon the state’s
recognized authority to regulate law practice, the relatively small impact of an instate diploma privilege on interstate commerce,93 and the evenhanded operation
of the privilege on both state residents and out-of-state residents.94 If those factors
(Judith A. Gundersen & Claire J. Guback eds., 2020) (detailing requirements for admission by
motion in each jurisdiction).
90. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 147.
91. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 310–11 (2013) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 328 (2003)).
92. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (university’s dismissal
of student from academic program).
93. See Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009)
94. See id. at 703–04; see also Nora, supra note 7, at 477–80 (arguing that strict scrutiny is
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persuaded a court to apply a balancing test, the court would have to determine
whether the interests promoted by the in-state diploma privilege were legitimate
(rather than protectionist) and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly
exceeded those local benefits.95
A traditional justification for in-state law diploma privileges is that in-state
schools are more likely than out-of-state schools to teach students about the state’s
own law.96 To defend a diploma privilege on that ground, a state could require
students applying for the privilege to document that they took one or more
courses focused on that state’s law. Alternatively, it could require the state’s law
schools to certify the inclusion of state law materials in the required or common
elective courses used to satisfy graduation requirements. Any such specifications
could support a claim that the preference for in-state graduates was justified by
their better familiarity with that state’s law.
If the in-state diploma privilege does not require that the schools educate
students in the state’s law,97 then the state would have to identify other reasons
why graduation from an in-state school establishes a lawyer’s competence in ways
that graduation from an out-of-state school does not. Even though the curriculum
in the state’s schools may not focus on that state’s law, many professors do
reference state law when teaching. More important, students who attend school
in the state will almost invariably obtain knowledge of and experience in legal
practice in that state through clinics and externships, through part-time jobs
during the academic year, and often through legal jobs during the summers
between school years. The growth of experiential learning opportunities and
requirements, including the ABA accreditation standard mandating that each
graduate have at least six credits of experiential learning,98 provides a basis for
inappropriate, but that the Wisconsin diploma privilege violates the Dormant Commerce Clause
under the balancing test).
95. See Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 703–04.
96. See Nora, supra note 7, at 479–80.
97. As Judge Posner recognized in Wiesmueller, Wisconsin’s current diploma privilege does not
explicitly require a grounding in Wisconsin law but instead imposes general requirements that
students have completed courses in a wide range of mandatory and elective subject matter “having as
their primary and direct purpose the study of rules and principles of substantive and procedural law
as they may arise in the courts and administrative agencies of the United States and this state.” See
Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 702 (quoting WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2)). Virtually all law schools in the
country could satisfy those very general requirements. The subject areas listed by Wisconsin are:
Administrative law, appellate practice and procedure, commercial transactions,
conflict of laws, constitutional law, contracts, corporations, creditors’ rights, criminal
law and procedure, damages, domestic relations, equity, evidence, future interests,
insurance, jurisdiction of courts, legislation, labor law, ethics and legal responsibilities
of the profession, partnership, personal property, pleading and practice, public
utilities, quasi-contracts, real property, taxation, torts, trade regulation, trusts, and
wills and estates.
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2)(a). The rule further requires that at least thirty of the credits be earned in
a shorter list of mandatory basic law courses—“constitutional law, contracts, criminal law and
procedure, evidence, jurisdiction of courts, ethics and legal responsibilities of the legal profession,
pleading and practice, real property, torts, and wills and estates.” Id. § 40.03(2)(b).
98. See STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH., Standard
303(1)(3)
at
16
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions
_to_the_bar/standards/2019-2020/2019-2020-aba-standards-and-rules-of-procedure.pdf
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concluding that graduates from in-state law schools have learned about that state’s
practice, whether or not the curriculum includes instruction in that state’s law.
Moreover, many schools employ adjunct instructors to deliver course content, and
those adjunct instructors are state-based practitioners who bring that practice
experience into the classroom, whether or not the course focuses on state law.
In addition to clinics, field placements, and part-time jobs, all of which result
in practice-focused learning inside the state, there are numerous important
opportunities in all law schools for students to interact with judges, lawyers, and
other legal professionals outside the classroom. Judges and members of the bar
volunteer their time to local law schools because they understand that the
transition from student to ethical attorney requires more than the formal
curriculum. The multiple events in which law students interact with judges and
attorneys from the jurisdiction in which the law school is located educate law
students about what is expected of practitioners in that jurisdiction and how those
practitioners operate as legal professionals in the state.
And the education flows in both directions. Some law professors devote
significant time to state bar activities, working alongside practitioners and judges
to improve legal education, practice, and the professional transition between the
two. State supreme court justices and other bar leaders who regularly visit local
law schools learn firsthand about those law schools, routinely meeting students,
faculty, and administrators. In this way, a jurisdiction’s licensing authorities can
gain confidence in the competence of the graduates.99
Based on the numerous ways in which students in a state’s law schools acquire
knowledge of and skills connected to state-based practice, and the extent to which
judges and practitioners in the state become familiar with the students and the
legal education offered by the state’s schools, in-state schools have means of
demonstrating a new lawyer’s competence to practice in that state that out-of-state
schools lack. An in-state diploma privilege does not prevent graduates of other law
schools from practicing within a state; it is merely one avenue among several for
demonstrating that a law school graduate possesses minimum competence to
practice law. States creating an in-state privilege should be careful to document
the basis for that privilege but, if they do, a court applying the Dormant
Commerce Clause’s balancing test should have little trouble finding that the local
benefits of the in-state diploma privilege outweigh the burden on interstate
commerce imposed by granting that diploma privilege.
The Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence makes it
impossible to predict with certainty what level of scrutiny that Court or lower
courts would apply to in-state diploma privileges that include at least one private
school. These privileges facially discriminate between in-state and out-of-state
schools, creating a serious prospect that a court would apply strict scrutiny and
invalidate the privilege. On the other hand, Judge Posner offers a plausible
argument for applying the more lenient balancing test. If one focuses on the direct
[https://perma.cc/U53K-LQ48].
99. See Huffman v. Mont. Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175, 1183 (D. Mont. 1974) (finding
diploma privilege justified because the Montana Supreme Court was able to maintain a close
relationship with faculty, students, and curriculum).
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recipients of the privilege (the law school graduates), rather than the law schools,
any impact on interstate commerce is both indirect and evenhanded: residents of
any state may matriculate at in-state law schools and enjoy the benefits of a
diploma privilege. A state’s power to regulate law practice, moreover, is wellrecognized.100
For these reasons, we urge courts to apply the balancing test to assessment of
in-state diploma privileges. This will allow the court to balance the burden on
interstate commerce against the rationales for the privilege. If a state offers
thoughtful, evidence-based rationales for the privilege, then we believe courts
would uphold in-state privileges under the balancing test. These rationales are
most likely to exist when a state adopts a diploma privilege after careful reflection
on the competencies it seeks for licensing and a comparison of the experience of
law students in in-state schools with out-of-state ones.
Note, however, that even if a court adopts the balancing test we urge, that test
is unlikely to sustain an emergency in-state diploma privilege enacted in response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Adoption of an emergency privilege allows little time
to identify competencies or reflect on the differences between in-state and out-ofstate schools. Rationales for the privilege, moreover, might not fit with the state’s
previously declared goals for licensing new lawyers. A state that administers the
Uniform Bar Exam, for example, would have difficulty justifying sudden adoption
of an in-state diploma privilege on the ground that in-state schools are more likely
than out-of-state ones to teach its state law.101 States contemplating adoption of
diploma privileges during the pandemic would be well advised to extend those
privileges to graduates of out-of-state law schools as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
COVID-19 threatens a major disruption in the licensing of 2020 law graduates.
Many jurisdictions will be unable to administer the July 2020 bar exam due to
proscriptions on large gatherings and health risks to both test-takers and those
staffing the bar examination. Those same jurisdictions face continued uncertainty
about the prospect of administering the exam any time in 2020. State supreme
courts will have to determine how to license lawyers in order to help meet the
growing need for legal services generated by this crisis, while also protecting the
public.
As this paper demonstrates, the Constitution places few limits on using a
diploma privilege to meet those goals. Privileges extended to graduates of both instate and out-of-state schools raise no constitutional issues. Diploma privileges
limited to in-state public law schools are likewise safe. States could adopt these
kinds of diploma privileges either as emergency measures responding to the
COVID-19 pandemic or as more lasting approaches to licensing.

100. E.g., Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 704.
101. The Uniform Bar Exam does not test the law of any state. Instead, it tests general
“knowledge and skills that every lawyer should be able to demonstrate prior to becoming licensed to
practice
law.”
Uniform
Bar
Examination,
NAT’L
CONF.
B.
EXAMINERS,
http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ [https://perma.cc/6746-HMZJ].
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A privilege extended to graduates of in-state private schools, but denied to
graduates of out-of-state schools, would raise significant questions only under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. Here, states face two challenges. First, there is a
possibility that courts will find those distinctions facially discriminatory and apply
strict scrutiny to the state’s decision. A state might be able to satisfy that
demanding standard with the arguments outlined here, but a successful outcome
is far from assured.
Second, even if courts apply a less burdensome balancing test to in-state
diploma privileges, privileges adopted after careful deliberation are more likely to
survive scrutiny than emergency ones. A state could justify an ongoing in-state
diploma privilege by building a strong record tying the diploma privilege to the
type of competencies in-state students develop and the avenues they have to
demonstrate those competencies to the state’s practicing bar over three years. A
state adopting an emergency diploma privilege would struggle to create that type
of record.
The Constitution should not stand as a barrier when a state establishes
evidence-based means for determining minimum competence for licensing its new
lawyers. Courts must be wary of economic protectionism but should also be open
to a variety of methods for assessing attorney competence. If a state has
thoughtfully designed an in-state diploma privilege and can offer evidence of
concrete differences between in-state and out-of-state law schools, we urge courts
to uphold the privilege even when it is limited to in-state schools that include a
private law school.

